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ABSTRACT
Many question the health and competitiveness of U.S.
industry. In today's global markets we have seen U.S.
dominance erode in several large industries. These indus-
tries include consumer electronics, automobiles and machine
tools. When analyzing the nation's industrial base, one area
of concern beyond final goods is the utilization of foreign
sourced materials in domestic products. It was suggested that
as much as 30 percent of the components in U.S. test equipment
might be foreign sourced. The purpose of this study was to
test that hypothesis, narrowing the scope to the manufacturing
of production special test equipment (STE). As used here,
production STE is that test equipment designed for and
typically unique to a given production effort. A case study
was done with the production STE of the HARM missile. This
case study, coupled with the expert opinion of industry
representatives, suggests only marginal dependence on foreign
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The health and continued strength of the U.S. industrial
base will play a significant role in the future security of
the U.S., not only in military terms, but of equal importance,
economic terms. Today, government officials and leaders of
industry question the ability of America's industry to
successfully compete in the global market place. Many of
these same government and industry representatives question
the ability of the nation's defense industrial base to meet
the military hardware requirements of a surge or mobilization
situation.
A definition of the nation's industrial base should not be
necessary. The defense industrial base, in general terms, is
comprised of those industries that provide the military goods
and services to support peacetime as well as surge and
mobilization requirements. The defense industries are
generally thought of as those prime contractors that produce
weapons systems such as tanks, aircraft and ships.
In fact, the defense industry also includes thousands of
lower tier subcontractors that supply their products to the
primes. There is often little distinction between a defense
industry manufacturer and a non-defense industry manufacturer.
Issues that affect one will invariably affect the other
These issues include labor skills, materials availability,
production capabilities and environmental concerns.
The general populace, not necessarily thinking in terms of
industrial base, is well aware of the increasing influence of
foreign producers in domestic markets. Recent years have seen
an extraordinary shift in relative power and position of
domestic manufacturers. Today, U.S. industries that dominated
the world at one time, are fighting to retain portions of
their former market shares. Others are fighting jtst to
survive. The best known examples of industries that have
experienced or are experiencing these changes include consumer
electronics, automobiles and machine tools.
In addition to foreign produced final products making such
progress against U.S. manufacturers, materials and components
made abroad are also making. advances. While the U.S. has
pursued high technology industries, other countries, most
notably Pacific Rim countries, have developed their resources
and relative competence to compete in high volume, low
technology industries. Here, many of these foreign
competitors are able to capitalize on economies of scale and
a large semi-skilled work force.
The reliance of U.S. manufacturers on foreign sourced
materials is of particular concern today. In addition to
anxieties over lost jobs ind displaced U.S. workers, there is
concern that as dependence on foreign sourced materials
increases, so does the country's potential economic
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vulnerability. Specifically, should the flow of foreign
sourced materials be disrupted, undesired politico-economic
consequences may follow.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Foreign sourcing of materials used by U.S. industry is an
area of increasing concern. Concurrent with declining
industrial base capabilities there appears to be an increasing
dependence on foreign sources for many of our industrial
needs. In one significantly large industry, test equipment,
an informal study had suggested that as much as 30 percent of
the components within U.S. test equipment are produced by
foreign manufacturers. [Ref. 1]
The intent of this research is to examine the components
in special test equipment (STE) used by a single manufacturer
in the production process, and to determine the extent of the
foreign composition of that STE. This thesis will demonstrate
an approach for identifying the geographic origin of the
components within production STE, and hence the extent of
dependence upon foreign sourced items in this critical field.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In an attempt to examine the extent and possible
implications to the industrial base of foreign sourced
materials in production STE, the following research questions
are pertinent.
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1. Primary Research Ouestion
To what extent are the components and materials used
to manufacture special test equipment obtained from foreign
sources and what are the implications of reliance upon foreign
sources?
2. Secondary Research Ouestions
- What are the STE components and materials?
- What components and materials are obtained exclusively
from foreign sources, or, in addition to domestic
sources?
- What are the pzincipal reasons components and materials
are obtained from foreign sources?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Depending on the application, the term "special test
equipment" can have many meanings. For the purposes of this
research, special test equipment will be limited to that test
equipment which is used solely in the production process. To
further reduce the field to a manageable level, given the
constraints of time and resources, this research was
restricted to special test equipment used by a single prime
contractor in the production of missiles. The production STE
of Texas Instruments' HARM missile program provided the
foundation for this study.
There are two limiting factors one must consider when
evaluating the data developed in this study. First, no STE
units were reduced to their component parts, i.e.,
disassembled. The materials and components that were analyzed
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were those used to support continuing operations. Continuing
operations were those actions required to maintain and/or
modify existing equipment. It is the researcher's opinion
that the requirements of continuing operations and those of
initial construction will be reasonably similar for
determining the country of origin of the components in
general. That opinion is supported by the STE Engineering
Supervisor of the HARM missile program.
A second limitation was the depth and breadth of research
possible with the limited resources available. Had more time,
funding, and personnel been available, a more statistically
significant analysis would have been developed. Preferably,
more components and suppliers would have been examined, and
ultimately subassemblies would have been examined in greater
detail.
E. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A detailed accounting of the evolution and final research
methodology is presented in Chapter IV. An overview of the
research methodology follows.
Concurrent with the decision to investigate the extent and
implications of foreign sourced materials in manufacturing
production STE, the determination was made to use missile
programs for the case study. Several missile program offices
were contacted within Naval Air Systems Command. Of those
solicited, each granted their approval to pursue this study in
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their program area. The program offices then provided points
of contact in the government offices co-located at a prime
contractor's facilities. In turn, the government
representatives provided access tc the contractor's production
STE personnel. The enormity of the size and scope of the
research was soon realized. This led to a series of
downsizing decisions. One program and manufacturer were
ultimately selected--the HARM missile program and Texas
Instruments, Inc.
An initial site visit was utilized to gain familiarity
with the missile program, production STE and to finalize a
procedure to conduct the study. Sizeable cost and personnel
requirements, beyond the resources available, would have been
required to break out STE to the piece-part level.
As a result, the data used to determine what materials and
components were foreign sourced were limited to material usage
data from continuing operations. Continuing operations are
those actions required to maintain and/or modify existing
equipment. The raw data were available in part due to
requirements pertaining to government funded programs. The
data included Texas Instruments' part numbers, manufacturer's
part numbers and supplier names. A second list, with
supplier's telephone numbers and points of contact, was
prepared from the files of a manufacturing assistant.
With this information, the suppliers were contacted and
their assistance requested in determining the nomenclature of
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the part numbers and their place of origin. Several
suppliers, particularly the actual manufacturers, were able to
provide that information over the telephone. Others,
primarily distributors, requested that copies of the raw data
be telecopied to them for further research. Of these,
approximately one-half responded with all or most of the
requested information. Follow-on telephone calls were made to
clarify any ambiguities in the responses. Finally, the data
were segregated to be evaluated with regard to the research
questions.
In addition to a physical determination of components and
their origin, the professional opinions of industry
representatives were also obtained. These individuals were
all directly involved in production STE, the electronics
industry, or both. As a final source, information was
gathered from existing literature. For this study, existing
literature turned out to be of minimum value.
Research questions were addressed and conclusions drawn
based on analysis of the previously stated production STE
data, professional opinions of industry representatives and
existing literature. Since data from only part of one
manufacture's STE were used, the results are not statistically
conclusive. It is the opinion of the researcher, however,
that they support an implication regarding foreign sourced
materials and production STE.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II presents the reader with a review of the
existing literature and provides a general background of
industrial base issues with an emphasis on foreign sourcing
concerns. Chapter III provides an overview of special test
equipment and government property, and how they are managed
with government contracts. Chapter IV is an in-depth
description of how the research methodology evolved. Chapter
V is a presentation and analysis of the data as derived from
the HARM missile production site. Finally, Chapter VI
provides answers to the research questions, a summary and
suggestions for further study.
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II. BACKGROUND and LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
Reliance on foreign sourced materials, technology and
capital equipment within the United States is more than a
question of unemployed American workers and corporate profits
remaining with overseas firms. Many U.S. companies,
particularly lower-tier manufacturers, are closing their
doors. Foreign sourcing is now an industrial base issue that
deals with potential dependence on, and vulnerability to, non-
domestic suppliers. While these issues have been addressed in
the past, recent years have seen a resurgence in concern over
the capabilities of our nation's industries. Certainly there
are opposing views, but many feel that U.S. industries are
losing or have already lost their dominance and competitive
positions in a global economic society. The strength of
America's industrial base is fundamental to continued growth
of the nation's economy, its military and economic security,
and to sustaining the quality of life most U.S. citizens have
come to expect and enjoy.
The defense industrial base (DIB) is an important segment
of the nation's industrial base. The defense industrial base
is characterized as those products, materials and
manufacturing capabilities essential to meet not only
peacetime military requirements, but also surge and
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mobilization requirements. A subfunction of the nation's
industrial base, the requirements for a strong defense
industrial base are generally the same. To meet its
requirements, the DIB requires resources such as skilled
labor, advanced production processes and engineering talents
similar to those throughout all of industry.
B. CONCERNS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The health of America's industrial base, including its
reliance on foreign sourced materials, is not a new issue. To
varying degrees, the concerns of foreign dependence,
vulnerability and erosion of U.S. capabilities have been
addressed since the earliest days of the nation. In his
"Report on Manufactures" sent to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on December 5, 1791, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The Secretary of the Treasury in obedience to the order of
ye House of Representatives, of the 15th day of January
1790, has applied his attention, at as early a period as his
other duties would permit, to the subject of Manufactures;
and particularly to the means of promoting such as will tend
to render the United States, independent on foreign nations,
for military and other essential supplies.
Throughout the years of the industrial revolution, the
United States entered a unique balance between the opposing
philosophies of international mercantilism and isolationism.
Maintaining political distance from much of the world, the
U.S. was at the same time expanding and developing foreign
interests for economic purposes. The growing domestic
industry was essentially self-sustaining. Less expensive
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materials and labor abroad were instrumental in creating
profitable ventures, but the use of foreign sourced materials
was not in itself critical to American industry.
America's involvement in the Second World War renewed
concerns of foreign dependence as well as surge and
mobilization capabilities. Following the war, the National
Security and Defense Production Acts of 1948 provided official
recognition of U.S. dependence on imported minerals and raw
materials. These legislative actions paved the way for the
stockpiling of critical materials and the creation of standby
allocations to safeguard sources of supply against future
national emergencies, such as another war. [Ref. 2:p. 1) As
defined in the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling
Act (1946), strategic and critical materials are those
materials that:
1. would be needed to supply the military, industrial and
essential civilian needs of the United States during a
national emergency, and
2. are not found or produced in the United States in
sufficient quantities to meet such need.
However, the economic prosperity of the times did not
encourage a close or lasting scrutiny of foreign sourced
material issues.
Emerging from World War II as the world's undisputed
leader in manufacturing capability, the U.S. had no industrial
or financial competition. An item produced in the United
States would be readily accepted in any market. Through the
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1950's and into the 1960's the U.S. remained the world's
industrial powerhouse. It was not until the mid-1960's that
some would again begin addressing the issue of foreign
dependence. However, beyond the Department of Defense,
several think tanks and a few industry executives, foreign
sourcing was not an issue of importance.
The oil embargo of 1973 was the first time the average
citizen was able to truly identify with the potential impact
of foreign dependence. The frustrations of the moment raised
cries for more fuel efficient products and the development of
alternative fuels. Most importantly, it awakened America to
one aspect of a dependence on a foreign sourced good.
Unfortunately, even when there are wide-spread hardships and
frustrations resulting from events such as the oil embargo,
there is a short memory once these crises pass. There will
always be a new "crisis" to fill the void and redirect
energies. In attempting to rationalize the lack of public
understanding and awareness in areas equally important but
less visible then oil, former Congressman James D. Santini
stated, "You don't buy cans of cobalt off the grocery shelf."
(Ref. 2:p. 2]
Throughout the 1970's and 1980's the DoD, Congress and
several Presidential Administrations initiated policies to
continue identifying and stockpiling items that were not only
critical to the industrial base, but essential to military
objectives. Going a step further, the most recent legislation
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requires the DoD to expand its planning to incorporate an
"Industrial Preparedness Plan." The ultimate purpose of
industrial preparedness planning is to provide adequate
capabilities, both in materials and manufacturing capacity, to
meet peacetime as well as surge and mobilization requirements.
[Ref. 3]
The past several years have not only seen government
officials and industry leaders, but now the general populace
as well, beginning to recognize the potential dangers of
increased foreign dependence. An emerging concern gaining
acceptance is that the United States is losing its
technological advantages in conjunction with increasing
dependence on foreign materials. It is the opinion of many
that the United States has not only lost its dominant
position, but is actually falling behind other industrialized
nations. As this concern develops, the country is simultan-
eously seeing an unprecedented increase of imported goods.
These are imported goods that are no longer relegated to items
such as exotic metals mined only in other countries. Now
imports also include automobiles, electronics equipment and
machine tools. In many instances they are displacing U.S.
producers in domestic markets.
C. DOMESTIC CAPABILITIES
Although slightly dated, results of a 1984 survey by
Purchasing magazine are unsettling. Questioning U.S.
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companies on their use of foreign sourced materials, 62
percent of the respondents indicated that they would maintain
the same level of imported goods they had the previous year.
An additional 27 percent said they would increase their use of
foreign sourced materials. Only 11 percent said they intended
to use fewer foreign sourced items. [Ref. 4)
Unfortunately, the survey results were not segregated by
industry and specific types of purchases. This would have
presented a more accurate picture of the distribution of the
use of foreign materials by industry. In general, the types
of materials obtained by the survey respondents covered an
extremely broad spectrum. These materials included steel,
machine tools, fasteners, valves, repair parts, chemicals,
electronic components, decorative ornaments and paper-backed
wall coverings.
The respondents rated their foreign and domestic suppliers
in the following manner:
Respondents rating Respondents rating
domestic suppliers foreign suppliers





Technical assistance 64% 36%
Obviously most companies will weigh a variety of factors
before choosing their vendors. But, in a highly competitive
environment, price and quality are generally considered
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crucial to maintaining a competitive position. The survey
respondents rated foreign suppliers favorably in both of these
categories. The foreign suppliers were rated poorly in
responsiveness and technical assistance. Week performance in
these areas is often a result of geographical separations. As
communications technologies continue to advance, there is the
possibility that off shore suppliers will increase their
competitive position in these categories also.
A two-year study by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, released in 1989, confirmed that U.S. productivity
in major industrial sectors was declining. (Ref. 5] This
study was based solely on the productivity of eight key U.S.
industries. It did not address the impact of events such as
trade deficits and global economic changes. The eight
industries examineC were commercial aircraft, consumer
electronics, computers and semiconductors, machine tools,
chemicals, automobiles, steel and textiles. These industries
account for approximately 28 percent of this country's
manufacturing. They are also responsible for approximately
one-half of all U.S. imports and exports of manufactured
goods.
Examples of situations where the U.S. has lost a dominate
position in a market over the last 20 years abound. They
include the auto industry, machine tools and consumer
electronics. One of the most recent shifts in dominance is
in the semiconductor industry. Today these components are
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critical to untold thousands of products throughout the world.
Additionally, their use and sophistication is continuously
expanding. Domestic electronics products tied to the
semiconductor industry provide approximately 2.6 million jobs
for U.S. workers. (Ref. 6)
In 1980 the U.S. dominated the semiconductor industry,
providing 61 percent of the world's sales. By 1985 the U.S.
had dropped to 44 percent and Japan had risen to 44 percent
of world sales. In 1989 Japanese sales of semiconductors
outperformed U.S. sales by 12 percent. Revenues from
semiconductor sales tripled in the U.S. between 1982 and 1988.
In Japan, revenues had risen sixfold over that same period.
[Ref. 6)
In the domestic market, U.S. semiconductor manufacturers'
share of the market has been reduced to approximately 70
percent while Japanese semiconductors have increased in market
share from five to approximately 30 percent. In Japan, U.S.
manufacturers have maintained only a ten percent share of the
semiconductor market over the past ten years. [Ref. 6]
A particular concern is that foreign sourced items may
become vulnerable items, i.e., an item that is provided by a
foreign source only with no alternatives available should
trade be inhibited. There are two ways for this to happen.
First, the raw materials are not available within the U.S.;
second, U.S. technological advances do not keep pace with
other nations. One example of this vulnerability was when
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researchers at Bell Labs had to wait one year for delivery of
a laser diode from Hitachi. The diode was a critical
component in an optical computer research proqram. [Ref. 7]
Sony Chairman Akio Morita and former Japanese minister
Shintaro Ishihara believe that the Japanese have such advanced
production skills and sophisticated semiconductors that the
U.S. could become almost totally dependent on Japan. They
argue that if the supply of advanced semiconductors to the
U.S. were cut off, and redirected to the Soviet Union, Japan
could reshape the balance of power. (Ref. 6]
The semiconductor industry is divided into two general
segments: semiconductor manufacturing, and the supply of
equipment and materials. One of only two U.S. firms capable
of providing semiconductor manufacturing equipment, Perkin-
Elmer Corporation, had been unable to find a U.S. buyer for
its optical lithograph equipment. Optical lithography is a
critical process in the manufacture of semiconductors. When
the possible acquisition of Perkin-Elmer's highly
sophisticated unit by a Japanese firm surfaced, it caused
concern through both industry and DoD. (Ref. 8]
A final view of these trends is reflected in the U.S.
trade deficit. A somewhat positive reflection, the trade
deficit in low technology manufactured goods was narrowed by
$44 billion between 1986 and 1989. But countering this was a
shrinking trade surplus in high technology manufactured goods.
Between 1986 and 1989 this surplus grew by only $11.7 billion.
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As reported by the Commerce Department, the nation's "advanced
technology" trade surplus declined by $2.5 billion in 1989.
[Ref. 9]
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is a reflection of the
nation's industrial base. The technology, production
processes and sources of materials important to the DIB are
much the same as those important to the nation's industrial
base.
Aggravating the situation of the DIB, many firms refuse
to accept or are divesting themselves of government, and
particularly DoD business. According to a study by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, of 118,000 firms that
provided goods to the DoD in 1982, 80,000 had either closed or
turned exclusively to the civilian community by 1987. [Ref.
10] These figures are particularly discouraging when
considering the high defense spending of the period.
Many reasons are given by companies for turning away
defense work. Some of the major reasons include excessive
paper work, poor and overly restrictive specifications,
excessive oversight and program instability.
Burdensome paper work was cited by 70 percent of the
respondents in a 1988 survey as one of the leading causes of
problems when dealing with the government. When firms sell
to the government, administration costs are significantly
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greater than when dealing with commercial enterprises. These
costs result from special office arrangements and personnel
specially trained in government procedures, multiple forms,
excessive documentation and inconsistencies between
specifications and statements of work. [Ref. 11]
Excessive oversight is a continuous and well-documented
point of contention. Private industry commits extensive
resources to preparing numerous reports and supporting a
variety of audits. As an example of the situation at one
production facility, for every General Electric engineer on a
military jet engine production line, there is a DoD inspector
and auditor. By contrast, no one from the commercial airline
or airframe industry monitors the commercial jet engine
production line. (Ref. 10] To ensure honesty among the
contractors, the government employs 26,000 auditors. Not only
does this create non-value added inspections which increase
costs, it creates the impression that the entire defense
industry is inefficient and dishonest. [Ref. 5]
Impacting the lower tier subcontractors, as well as the
prime contractors, is program instability. For example, the
original Army request for the AH-64 helicopter was 1300
aircraft. It changed to 575, then 1200, and most recently
840. Allied-Signal invested $106 million of its research
funds in the development of the F-109 engine to be used in a
new Air Force trainer. The entire program was cancelled.
(Ref. 12] Inherent destabilizing factors of the current
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defense acquisition process are annual appropriations and
dynamic political situations. These are exaggerated by
unrealistic and over optimistic projections of both quantities
and prices, by both industry and DoD.
Companies are not reinvesting in capital equipment, which
is producing a long range impact on the DIB, and to some
extent the nation's industrial base. Failure to reinvest will
prohibit industries from maintaining competitive advantages in
advanced technologies and production processes. Additionally,
because companies that do not reinvest in capital equipment
will have depreciated their equipment, those that do reinvest
may not be able to successfully compete in price competition.
In recent years price competition has dominated government
procurement.
In a 1988 report to the Secretary of Defense by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the following was noted:
[Ref. 13:p. 25)
- Critical defense industries did no worse than overall
manufacturers in maintaining a domestic market share in
the face of substantial import growth;
- Critical defense industries did worse than overall
manufacturers in terms of adding to productive capacity,
with only 41 percent of critical defense industries
matching or exceeding the overall manufacturing average
growth in productive capacity;
- Three-quarters of critical defense industries achieved
worse than average growth in real shipments;
- Sixty-two percent of critical defense industries had
lower than average capital expenditures in 1980. This
adverse trend continued in 1985, when 72 percent had lower
than average capital expenditures;
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Forty-seven percent of critical defense industries had
below average productivity growth (17 actually had
declining productivity);
- Critical defense industries achieved average or above
average profitability.
In response to a request in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, DoD provided Congress
with a list of technologies that they determined to be
critical to defense. The Pentagon highlighted 22 technologies
"with great promise of ensuring the long-term superiority of
United States weapons systems." (Ref. 14] The technologies
deemed critical by DoD are not exclusively focused on pure or
direct military applications. They include technologies that
will determine the future health and global competitiveness of
the nation's industries. Among the 22 technologies were
microelectronics circuits and their fabrication, preparation
of gallium arsenide and other compound semi-conductors,
software producibility, machine intelligence and robotics,
fiber optics, and biotechnology materials and processing.
Many of the DIB concerns lie with the health of the lower
tier subcontractors. Over 70 percent of the companies that
make up the DIB are classified as subcontractors. Since the
end of the Viet Nam War, thousands of firms in this category
have dropped out of the defense business and others are
reluctant to expand. [Ref. 15:p. 2.5] In the event of a
surge or mobilization, it is in the lower tiers that bottle-
necks are expected. Even though primes are expected to have
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the required capacity, the subcontractors will not have
sufficient capacity to meet the demands of those primes
competing for limited resources.
An example of the potential impact of the loss of a lower
tier supplier occurred in 1989, when NASA and the DoD lost
their only qualified supplier of rayon fiber. Continuous
filament, carbonizable rayon yarn is used in a variety of
products. These include shuttle booster motors,
intercontinental .missiles, and tactical missiles such as the
Stinger. The Avtex Fibers Co., a fifth level subcontractor,
closed its doors after a year long battle over environmental
issues. In this case NASA and DoD were able to approve
emergency funding and have Avtex opened long enough to produce
materials to stockpile. The next permanent source is not
expected to be qualified until May, 1991. [Ref. 16]
There is general agreement that most technological
breakthroughs occur at the subcontractor level. The
subcontractors are the experts in their field and innovation
is often the key to their survival. As the lower tiers shrink
in numbers, there will be less competition, subsystem research
and development will suffer, and entrepreneurship will
diminish. [Ref. 17] The final result will be a less
responsive and capable DIB. Clearly, the well-being of lower
tier subcontractors is essential to avoiding dramatic,
negative impacts on the capabilities of prime contractors.
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E. HEALTHY ASPECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
There is no escaping the fact that Japan, with an economy
half the size of the U.S., took the lead in technology
intensive exports in 1986. Or, that in 1989, Japan exceeded
U.S. investments in industrial plants and equipment by nine
percent. [Ref. 18] Currently the U.S. has almost half of the
world's technical Ph.D's. But, as education levels rise
throughout the world, that advantage will erode. Still, the
health of the nation's industry is not such that the country
is necessarily destined to a position of international
inferiority.
The U.S. has the highest manufacturing productivity in the
world, and is still the world's greatest exporter.
Unemployment has been steady at between five and six percent
and exports have been steady at approximately 22 percent of
GNP. [Ref. 19] Despite unfavorable balances between high and
low technology exports, U.S. exports are increasing.
The U.S., both industry and government, spends $15 billion
a year on basic research, more than any other country. Within
the U.S. there are 15 million companies engaged in almost
every discipline known to man. American companies and
laboratories led the way in reproducing millions of copies of
a DNA strand, advancing plastics and composite materials, and
developing high speed computers and components. In the
semiconductor industry, IBM brought out the world's first 4
megabit memory chip. [Ref. 19]
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Corporations within the U.S. hold patents on and produce
the world's best fiber optic cables. At AT&T, research is
under way to develop an optical computer. Dr. Alan Huang,
head of the optical research department at Bell Labs, believes
a simple optical computer can be assembled before 1995. A
member of Dr. Huang's team, David Miller, developed the first
photonic switching chip, the Self Electro-optic Effect Device
(SEED). (Ref. 7]
The impact of government spendingliarticularly defense
spending, on the nation's industrial base has been
substantial. Two of the nation's strongest industries,
aerospace and telecommunications, are direct results of
government spending. The household micro wave is the result
of accelerated defense research during World War II.
But not everyone believes defense spending is the best
method to project America's industry ahead. Corporate
executives interviewed for a report by the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, saw the Defense Department as a sponsor of
technologies that have little commercial relevance. They said
that defense contractors exist in a kind of "ghetto," working
with technologies and business practices that actually hinder
them from competing in the commercial market place. [Ref. 20]
Government and DoD procurement rules are such that
corporations that supply similar items to both private
industry and the defense industry are forced to establish
separate divisions for each. The results are often lower
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quantities in the defense division and higher overhead costs.
The result is that DoD pays considerably more for an identical
or similar item than private industry.
Another issue concerns the resources consumed by DoD on
research. Up to half of the research and development (R&D)
in this country is defense related. The money spent on
defense R&D detracts from that which firms could otherwise use
to pursue R&D with commercial applications. Additionally,
many of the nation's most skilled scientists and engineers are
hired away from commercial practices. [Ref. 20]
Others see DoD's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) as America's answer to Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). MITI, which targets
about $1 billion annually at selected R&D areas, is widely
credited with Japan's postwar economic recovery and
international preeminence. [Ref. 21] Despite problems
associated with government spending discussed earlier, these
individuals believe DoD is the only organization powerful
enough to do for the U.S. what MITI did for Japan.
Although DoD is not a large enough customer to sustain an
industry, the capabilities of many industries are a concern of
DoD. When the machine tool industry went into a steep
decline, the Defense Department provided $15 million to the
National Center for Manufacturing Sciences. Other industries
targeted for DoD assistance are advanced synthetic materials
and the manufacturing of ball bearings. (Ref. 20]
25
In conjunction with the Defense Science Board (DSB), DARPA
provides R&D defense dollars for dual-use, or technologies
with military and commercial applications. Current programs
of DARPA include $30 million to companies interested in
developing high-definition television (HDTV), $25 million for
research in superconductivity, and $4 million to a small
Silicon Valley manufacturer to aid in developing a faster
gallium arsenide computer chip. [Ref. 22]
A joint venture between private industry and DoD, the
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Institute (SEMATECH)
pursues research for the purpose of "providing important
commercial advantages to U.S. semiconductor manufacturers by
developing and transferring advanced manufacturing
technologies." [Ref. 23] A non-profit consortium of 14
electronics companies, SEMATECH, was formed in August 1987.
Since it was authorized by Congress in December 1987, SEMATECH
has received $100 million annually from DoD. This represents
approximately half of SEMATECH's budget. The member companies
contribute the remaining funds.
The health and vitality of the nation's industrial base
is a critical element in the equation that determines the
nation's health and prosperity. Within the nation's
industrial base, the DIB reflects the same general strengths
and weaknesses. To ensure economic competitiveness in a
global market, and ultimately the security of the nation, it
is essential that continued focus be given to such areas as
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education, new technology and process R&D, productivity, and
foreign sourcing.
In the study performed by this researcher, an attempt was
made to determine the extent to which foreign sourced
components were used in U.S. production special test
equipment. The following chapter provides the reader with an
understanding of what production STE is and how it is managed
as government property in conjunction with a government
contract.
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III. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent and
implications of foreign sourced materials used in the
manufacturing of production special test equipment (STE). The
intent of this chapter is to provide the reader with an
understanding of what STE is, how it is used and the
administrative requirements that apply when STE is used to
perform a government contract.
In government contracting it is not uncommon for materi-
als, equipment or property to be furnished to the contractor
by the government. These items are referred to and categor-
ized as "GFM, GFE, and GFP." Government furnished materials
(GFM) are normally consumable items. An example would be a
bar stock furnished by the government for a specific purpose.
During the production process that bar stock will be reshaped,
cut and machined to become part of the final product.
An example of government furnished equipment (GFE) can be
illustrated with a military aircraft procurement. The prime
contractor is often referred to as a systems integrator. As
such, the prime does not build the entire aircraft in-house.
In many cases as much as 50 percent of the procurement is
subcontracted to other companies. However, not all of the
subsystems and components are subcontracted. Different
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subsystems, such as engines and fire control systems, are
frequently provided by the government. The government
contracts with individual companies for these subsystems and
then provides them to the aircraft manufacturer as GFE. The
prime contractor will then assemble the contractor procured
equipment and materials, and GFE, to produce the final
product.
The government may also furnish the contractor with
facilities, plant equipment, special tooling and special test
equipment. This is referred to as government furnished
property (GFP). Government property is all property "owned by
or leased to the government or acquired by the government
under terms of the contract. It includes both government
furnished property and contractor acquired property." [Ref.
24:Sec. 45.101] As used here, contractor acquired property is
that property which, under contract, the contractor procures
and for which he is reimbursed. The government retains title
of the property.
It is the written policy of the government that
contractors will ordinarily be required to furnish all
property needed to preform government contracts. Despite this
policy, contractors often use government property. When
contractors do possess government property, the government
agencies controlling that property are required to pursue the
following: [Ref. 24:Sec. 45.102]
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1. Eliminate to the maximum practical extent any competitive
advantage that might arise from using such property.
2. Require contractors to use government property to the
maximum practical extent in performing government contracts.
3. Permit the property to be used only when authorized.
4. Charge appropriate rentals when the property is
authorized for use on other than a rent-free basis.
5. Require contractors to be responsible and accountable for
keeping the government's official records of government
property in their possession or control.
6. Require contractors to review and provide justification
for retaining government property not currently in use.
7. Ensure maximum practical reutilization of contractor
inventory within the government.
GFP was used sparingly by contractors prior to the Second
World War. However, the mobilization requirements of that war
brought about an extensive use of government supplied
property. At the time the nation had limited industrial
capabilities, limited capital available for expansion, a
resistance to work with the government, and a belief that the
war would not last long enough to allow businesses to recover
from their capital investment expenses. [Ref. 25:p. 5]
Strong government intervention was required to assist and spur
industry to the production levels that would see the U.S.
through the war. To a large extent those early government
actions influenced today's government property and
government/contractor relationships. While the priorities may
have shifted since World War II, much of the same rational
remains today for the utilization of government property.
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There are many instances when it is to the government's
advantage to furnish GFP. Broken out by purpose, several
examples are provided below. (Ref. 26:p. 31]
1. Type of contract. On a cost reimbursement type of
contract, all assets acquired or produced that are paid for
by the government are, by definition, government owned
property.
2. Economy. A major reason for furnishing property to
contractors is to obtain a favorable price. The cost may be
reduced if the contractor does not have to acquire or build
certain types of assets that the government already owns.
3. Standardization. When several contractors are working on
a similar project or production item, it may be desirable
for the government to furnish equipment or materials in
order to assure uniformity in the end product.
4. Security. Sometimes, performance of the contract
requires the use of classified items, ( top secret, secret,
confidential) that can only be provided to the contractor by
the government.
5. Increased Competition. In those situations where only a
limited number of contractors are interested in responding
to a government solicitation because of the expensive
tooling or exotic machinery required, GFP may increase the
number of potential bidders by removing some of the main
handicaps to their participation. In some cases, GFP may
contribute to breaking out of a sole-source situation.
6. Support of Small Business. A small business may have the
labor, skills, and the source materials that are required to
perform certain types of government contracts, but may not
be able to afford the investment in certain expensive or
unique items of equipment. Government furnished equipment
can be used in such instances to support the DoD policy of
aid to small business.
7. To Expedite Production. Many tools, equipment, and
materials require long lead times to produce or acquire. If
the government can make such items available from existing
stocks, the lead time for end item production may be
substantially reduced.
8. Scarcity of Assets. Some types of items required for
performance of government are of such critical nature and in
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such a limited supply that only the government can guarantee
availability of the required quantity at the required time.
9. To Maintain the Industrial Base. Experience in several
major wars has taught us that certain types and quantities
of industrial equipment and tooling must be available at all
times in order to provide a base for rapid production of
essential military items. Private industry is neither
willing nor able to maintain the investment in equipment
required for this purpose. As a result, government owned
assets are used to supplement the industrial capability of
the civilian economy.
B. SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
The focus of this study is foreign sourced materials used
in production STE. There is no specific type of equipment
that muit be labeled STE. STE serves a multitude of purposes
and is as diverse as the processes and products of industry.
For purposes of government contracting, STE is defined as
follows: [Ref. 24:Sec. 45.101]
Special test equipment means either single or multi-
purpose integrated test units engineered, designed,
fabricated, or modified to accomplish special purpose
testing in performing a contract. It consists of items or
assemblies of equipment including standard or general
purpose items or components that are interconnected and
interdependent so as to become a new functional entity for
special testing purposes. It does not include material,
special tooling, facilities (except foundations and similar
improvements necessary for installing special test
equipment), and planit equipment items used for general plant
testing purposes.
The STE evaluated in this study was that used by Texas
Instruments at their HARM missile production site located in
Lewisville, Texas. Meeting the criteria of the definition
above, that STE was designed and built solely to support the
unique requirements of that production program. To avoid
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confusion, it should be noted that the term STE may be used to
represent one or many pieces of equipment. In the case of the
TeAds Instruments HARM missile program, over 130 different
pieces of equipment were designed and built by that company
and designated as STE. Texas Instruments was reimbursed for
the associated costs, and the government retained title.
These pieces of test equipment perform a variety of tests
and diagnostics throughout the production process. One
example may serve to clarify the use of STE. At the lowest
level of testing, components on a printed wiring board are
tested to insure that they perform the intended function of
that component. The resistors, transistors and integrated
circuits are each checked by a piece of STE to insure they are
functioning as designed.
At the next level of testing, with different STE, the same
printed wiring board is tested to ensure it functions properly
as a subassembly. This insures that all of the components are
performing together as desired. An example would be to test
an amplifier and feedback loop to insure that it does in fact
amplify a signal as planned, and is able to self-correct with
certain feedback.
A third level of testing involves a higher level
subassembly made up of several printed wiring boards. These
printed wiring boards have each been individually tested at
least twice previously. Then they are tested to insure that
they function together in a higher integrated subassembly.
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A final test would be conducted on the completed assembly.
The final assembly is tested and evaluated to insure that it
is capable of performing the function for which it was
designed. In this situation individual components will have
been tested at least four times.
There are no unique criteria for testing components,
subassemblies and final units. Required tests will be
determined in conjunction with the system design requirements.
Just as STE is different for each application, each production
process will have its own testing requirements. STE will be
built and configured to those needs.
Often STE is unique and is neither commercially available
nor furnished by the government. One of the methods for a
contractor to obtain GFP in such circumstances is to design
and build it themselves. Texas Instruments did this with most
of its HARM missile STE. Having designed the missile system
to be manufactured, they were the most qualified to design the
STE. The STE design first had to be approved by the
government. Texas Instruments then built the equipment that
was to be used to test their products throughout production.
Due to contract agreements, the government retains title to
the STE. If Texas Instruments later determines that a
modification is required, they must first get government
agreement, and then incorporate the modification. The
government may also initiate a modification to the contract
to change or expand test requirements.
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One exception to this tight control is when the contractor
uses its own financial resources to acquire or produce STE.
This is done when the contractor desires to retain title of
the equipment. This is likely to occur in situations
involving equipment with a specific function that will be
usable on other products or non-government contracts at a
later date.
This is illustrated by environmental chambers that Texas
Instruments maintains as capital equipment. The environmental
chambers dedicated to the HARM missile program are capable of
varying inside temperatures from approximately minus 45
degrees Celsius to plus 71 degrees Celsius. The purpose of
these chambers is to test the operation of subassemblies and
assemblies through a series of extreme temperature changes.
The environmental chambers are considered STE but are not
unique to producing HARM missiles, i.e., they may be used for
the testing of other systems. It is likely that Texas
Instruments will have additional future use for them that may
or may not be associated with a government contract.
C. PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION
The management of government property used by contractors
is a function of contract administration and is typically
under the auspices of the Administrative Contracting Officer
and a Property Administrator. It is also a joint
responsibility of both the government and contractor.
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When applicable, it is the government's responsibility to
insure that government property, in accordance with the
contract, is delivered to the contractor in a timely fashion
and in the condition both parties had agreed upon. Failure of
the government to do so may provide the contractor with
legitimate grounds to delay delivery.
Once the contractor has custody of government property,
whether delivered by the government or procured by the
contractor, the contractor is responsible for maintaining that
property. Levels of responsibility vary, depending on how the
contract is written.
Generally, when the contract is a firm fixed price (FFP)
contract, the contractor assumes total responsibility for the
property. If the contract is a cost reimbursement type
contract, the government assumes greater responsibility and
essentially self-insures. (Ref. 24:Sec. 45.103] With either
type of contract, the contractor is required to perform normal
maintenance and upkeep, and will not be held liable for normal
wear. As custodian, the contractor is also required to
maintain any applicable government records ard logbooks for
that equipment. Finally, it is the contractor's
responsibility to maintain a government approved method of
inventory and accountability.
Regardless of the contract type, the government's role is
one of oversight and equipment utilization management.
Oversight includes approving the contractor's property control
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system, making recommendations if disapproved, and performing
audits and inspections to insure compliance.
Proper equipment utilization includes the efficient use of
government property from its acquisition through disposal.
If, in response to a solicitation, the contractor indicates
that it is necessary to acquire or fabricate STE, it is the
contracting officer's responsibility to: (Ref. 24:Sec.
45.307)
1. Review the proposed items for necessity and proper
classification as "special" test equipment;
2. Screen the availability of existing government owned test
equipment in accordance with agency procedures; and
3. Notify the contractor, approving or disapproving the
acquisition or fabrication and, if it is disapproved, state
whether the equipment will be furnished by the government.
The screening for availability of existing equipment is
done through the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center
(DIPEC), at Memphis, Tennessee. Most STE, because of its
dollar value, will be classified as industrial equipment.
DIPEC is charged with managing all DoD industrial equipment.
Prior to a contracting officer approving new STE, a statement
of non-availability must be obtained from DIPEC. [Ref. 26:p.
36)
Once a contract is completed, or if GFP (to include STE)
becomes excess, there are extensive procedures to be followed
by the government. In general, and in priority as listed, the
Contracting Officer will: [Ref 24:Sec. 45.603]
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1. Encourage the purchase of the property, at cost, by the
contractor.
2. Redistribute the property throughout the government.
3. Donate the property to eligible causes.
4. Sell the property to parties other than the contractor
having custody.
5. Donate the property to public bodies.
6. Abandon or destroy the property.
Requirements, methods and procedures used to determine
eligibility when disposing of excess property are a function
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Agency regulations,
General Services Administration procedures and the procedures
of the Defense Property Disposal Service (DPDS).
As presented, government property, which includes STE, is
a unique area of contract requirements and administration. To
determine the extent of foreign sourced components in
production STE, the following chapter presents a detailed




The intent of this research is to examine the extent and
possible impact of foreign sourcing on a segment of the U.S.
industrial base. Test equipment, and the source of components
within test equipment, was selected to be the industrial base
segment studied. An informal study performed earlier by
another researcher had suggested that as much as 30 percent of
component parts that make up test equipment used in this
country is manufactured overseas. [Ref. 1] To narrow the
scope of this study, the determination was made to explore the
extent to which foreign sourced components were used in
special test equipment (STE).
STE was limited to that equipment used only in the
production manufacturing process. This is STE that is not
expected to be used in the field by government operating units
or their various levels of maintenance support. Typically,
this test equipment is unique to a specific manufacturer and
product line. It has been designed and manufactured by the
contractor to perform tests, take measurements and run
diagnostics on the subassemblies and final assemblies that are
produced at a single location. While not intended as part of
this study, some of the production STE eventually evaluated
was used by the manufacturer to perform both depot level
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maintenance functions and production functions. The
manufacturer's depot level maintenance function was an interim
measure that will not be required as the government acquires
organic capabilities.
The research evolved into two distinct elements. First,
a search and review of literature that may have already been
compiled in this area; and second, a limited physical
examination of selected test equipment and its components.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of the literature review was to acquire
knowledge of industrial base issues in general, to develop a
better understanding of potential U.S. dependencies and
vulnerabilities, and to examine any previous work that may
have been done specifically within the scope of this research
paper.
Initially, custom bibliographies were requested from the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Additional
sources included the General Accounting Office (GAO), Naval
Research Advisory Committee, Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley
Knox library, as well as such professional organizations as
the Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLE), Production
Management Institute (PMI), and the Semiconductor
Manufacturing Technology Institute (SEMATECH).
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The effort provided substantial information concerning
potential and established shortcomings within the U.S.
industrial base as well as areas of strength. However, no
documentation was discovered that addresses the issue of
foreign sourced components used in test equipment, or the
broad field of "test and measurement equipment."
In the course of coordinating the case study and searching
for applicable literature, many people in private industry and
professional associations were contacted. Representative
industries and associations include Motorola Inc., UNISYS
Corporation, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Inc., Society of
Logistics Engineers and the Production Management Institute.
Several of these are shown in the Bibliography. With
considerable experience in electronics, test equipment, or
both, these individuals offered their expert opinion on the
extent of foreign sourced components within production STE.
Although these individuals did not have conclusive proof of
their suspicions, their professional judgments were analyzed
and, when appropriate, conclusions made.
C. CASE STUDY
The original intent of this study was to examine the
component parts of several pieces of similar production STE.
Once identifying the individual component parts of which this
equipment was comprised, these components would be evaluated
in relation to the research questions.
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The broad field of production STE was further narrowed to
that equipment used in the support of government missile
programs. A government program was selected for two reasons.
One, the government programs are more closely aligned with
this researcher's background, current studies and future
career possibilities than a non-government program. Secondly,
a government program was more accessible and the research
charter carried the endorsement of the government program
management office.
The selection of production missile systems was based on
several factors. First, it was felt that a missile system was
something that could more easily be bounded than a weapons
system such as an aircraft or armored vehicle. These larger
weapons systems are comprised of a significant number of
subsystems, any of which could support a separate research
paper. It was also felt that working with a number of
subsystems would provide too much diversity when trying to
look at similar types of production STE used throughout
several programs.
Another concern was that subsystems produced by different
subcontractors might present many management layers between
the government program office and the management of the
subsystem. This would cause additional coordination efforts.
Also, since a missile system is a relatively small system,
more than one program could be studied. To provide a data
base of adequate size to make comparisons and draw conclusions
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with confidence, examination of three to five missile programs
was anticipated.
Only prime contractors' systems would be reviewed. It was
felt that management support at this level would be more
closely aligned with the government program office. Also,
unlike an aircraft manufacturer who is in many ways an
assembler and integrator, the missile manufacturers appeared
to be more closely involved with both the design and the
production of the entire product. Reduced comparative size
and complexity of a missile system permits the contractor to
be closer to the product. The significant perceived advantage
was that the prime contractor was not only close to the
product, but production facilities were much more contained.
An early key to this research was to select potential
missile programs, gain support of the government program
management office and acquire points of contact within the
prime contractor's facilities. Because of the researcher's
background in aircraft maintenance, air launched missile
systems were selected to be the study models. The program
offices of the Navy's air launched missiles are located within
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Washington, DC.
After selecting air launched missiles, it was a matter of
gaining access to each program manager, explaining the
background, puipose and intent of the study, and receiving
their approval to delve into this unique segment of their
program. Each of the four program managers contacted was
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willing to assist and allow this research to be conducted.
The program offices provided both endorsements and points of
contact within the contractor's facilities, or in the
government plant representative offices.
After discussing the proposed study with several program
managers, their field representatives and the appropriate
personnel within the contractor's organizations, it became
apparent that the scope of this research was still too broad.
Each production site had the potential of providing upwards of
hundreds of pieces of production STE. Even when narrowed to
like equipment, the prospect of evaluating the source of the
components within the equipment was unrealistic. It was
decided to use only three contractors. Despite what would be
a substantial effort on their part, companies representing
three programs expressed a willingness to participate in the
study.
The original programs selected were the HARM missile, the
Maverick missile and the Tomahawk (cruise) missile. There
were reservations with using the Tomahawk. The air launched
version of the Tomahawk was never operational and the missile
is considerably larger and more complex then either of the
other two. The additional complexities and subsystems might
make it difficult to draw comparisons between its production
STE and that of the others. However, the geographical
location of the production facility was the most favorable of
44
the three and would best lend itself to any travel
requirements.
As the thesis proposal continued to be developed with the
contractors, the enormity of the project continued to grow.
As a result, it was decided to limit the research to two
contractors and two missile systems. These were Texas
Instruments with the HARM missile and General Dynamics Convair
with the Tomahawk. Texas Instruments was selected because
they had shown the most interest and enthusiasm in the
project. Despite earlier reservations about the Tomahawk,
General Dynamics was chosen because they were interested and
provided the best geographical location should repeated visits
become necessary.
After narrowing the field to two contractors, it was felt
that a site visit to each would be beneficial. The most
significant benefit was to give the researcher a better
understanding of exactly what production STE is comprised of,
how it is used, and how it is developed and assembled.
Another strong case for the site visit was to meet face to
face with those who would be providing time and resources to
make this research possible. It was also hoped to better
definitize the project's scope and research methodology with
the benefit of corporate knowledge of the contractor's
personnel. Two full days were scheduled with each contractor.
Prior to the site visits to the participating
manufacturers, a visit of approximately two hours was
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coordinated with Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Inc., of
Sunnyvale, California. A short commute for the researcher,
the object of this visit was to begin to develop an
understanding of the terminology and major systems of a
missile, and the various types and applications of production
STE used in producing a missile. This trip proved to be very
beneficial in that it provided the researcher with a basic but
useful understanding and appreciation of the overall
production process of a missile system. It also provided
further insight to the enormity of the research task that
still lay ahead. Lockheed is the prime contractor of the
Trident II inter-continental ballistic missile.
The initial plant visit as part of the actual study was
with Texas Instruments and the HARM Missile program. It was
learned that Texas Instruments has over 130 pieces of test
equipment categorized as production STE and dedicated to the
HARM missile program. Because of the sheer numbers,
complexity and time constraints, it was decided to limit the
study to only one manufacturer. This proved to be the only
site visit as part of the study.
The original intent of the study was to look at several
production programs. This would provide a more statistically
valid sampling. However, from the very early phases of this
study, it was evident that the sample size would have to be
reduced. Again this was a factor of the size, complexity and
time available to conduct the research.
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A tour of the HARM missile production complex provided
considerable insight to both the missile being produced and
the manufacturing equipment involved in the process. While it
was not a requirement to develop a sound understanding of the
product, production process and support equipment, an
elementary understanding of these elements aided in developing
a better prospective of the types, functions and physical
characteristics of production STE. This provided better
insight to the entire research environment.
The next step in this process was to reduce a piece of the
STE to its component parts. It was originally believed that
it would be necessary to begin with equipment drawings and
then work back to the individual components. Next, the
components used would be physically identified. Finally, the
components would be tracked throughout purchasing and on to
the original suppliers and manufactures.
The personnel at Texas Instruments responsible for the
design, manufacture and maintenance of the HARM missile
program STE provided an alternative. Because all work and
materials used must be charged to a specific project code,
they were able to extract material usage information from
their information system data base by project and fiscal year.
Extracting the material usage for production STE over
several years provided a voluminous listing of raw data. This
included five years of material used to manufacture, modify
and maintain the STE. Again it was necessary to reduce the
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breadth to a manageable proportion. It was not possible to
pursue more than a fraction of the data provided.
The category chosen was the most recently completed fiscal
year of continuing operations. This included all materials
used by Texas Instruments to support the STE dedicated to the
HARM missile program. Choosing continuing operations was an
arbitrary decision. However, it was felt that components
required after the initial assembly of the equipment, or of a
repetitive nature, would be a more critical item in terms of
requirements and availability then a component inly used once,
in the initial assembly.
The most recently completed project for continuing
operations in which data were available was for the period
November 1988 to October 1989. Using only this particular
project, a computer generated usage list was developed. The
data fields requested provided the Texas Instruments part
number, original manufactures' part number, name of the
supplier, purchase order number and project code. The
software used was not able to provide a component nomenclature
for the individual part numbers. These data for one year
included approximately 1800 line items provided by
approximately 260 suppliers.
Individual suppliers were to be contacted and asked to
identify part numbers by nomenclature and indicate where that
component was produced. The geographical location of the
assembly site was requested in the case of assemblies.
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At this point, as the first information was being obtained
from suppliers, Texas Instruments was forced to reduce its
active assistance. This was primarily due to internal work
loads generated by operating at full capacity.
The loss of this valuable resource again forced a change
in the scope of the research. The original intent was to
follow as many of these components as possible, as far down
the supply chain as possible. It was hoped that the country
of manufacture could be determined in most instances, not only
for piece parts, but also for many of the components making up
the subassemblies.
With considerable raw data and limited resources it was
decided to continue as best possible. Suppliers that provided
the larger quantities of components to this project code were
contacted first, working down to the suppliers who provided
five or fewer components. Of approximately 260 suppliers
associated with this project, 62 were contacted. Those 62
suppliers represented approximately three-fourths of the
individual items or purchases over the one year period. Of
those contacted, 39 suppliers eventually provided usable
information.
Many of the suppliers, particularly those who provided few
items, were able to provide sufficient information over the
telephone on initial contact. This was particularly true when
the supplier was the manufacturer, or when the supplier was a
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distributor with a relationship to the manufacturer such that
they were knowledgeable of the requested information.
Twenty-one suppliers had requested that the Texas
Instruments data be telecopied to them for additional
research. Along with the data, a brief letter was sent
reiterating the nature of the study, its goals, and points of
contact within Texas Instruments. The purpose of providing
points of contact at Texas Instruments was to give suppliers
sufficient information to verify the researcher's relationship
to the company. Ten of these 21 suppliers responded with all
or portions of the requested information.
As stated, time and resources did not allow all suppliers
and components to be investigated. Many of the 260 suppliers
were not contacted because the unit price of the material they
provided was low. Typically these were inexpensive items with
unit costs of less than one dollar.
D. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED
No unusual difficulties were encountered in searching for
background information on industrial base issues. A
considerable amount has been written on the erosion, or
potential erosion, of U.S. industrial capabilities.
Surprising to this researcher was that significantly more
information was available through periodicals then directed
studies. This supports comments in the literature that only
ad hoc studies, vice comprehensive studies, have been
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completed in many industrial base areas. While none of the
literature reviewed discussed test equipment specifically,
this was a possibility that had been foreseen early in this
project.
The first changes in the size of the study came with the
realization that it would not be practical to look at several
missile programs. Then, even with the selection narrowed to
one program and one year of usage data for continuing
operations, the sheer magnitude of data to be examined was
prohibitive. It was not possible for one researcher to
adequately perform the desired depth and breadth of this
project. Specifically, it was not possible to contact all the
suppliers, and with very few exceptions, it was not possible
to go beyond the first tier of suppliers.
The unanticipated situation that forced Texas Instruments
to curtail much of its support removed considerable expertise
and corporate knowledge. This was exacerbated by the volume
of data to be investigated and the lack of resources, both
human and communications, available to this researcher.
On several occasions, component part numbers were not
recognizable. This was the result of two common problems:
first, the field width of the manufacture's part numbers was
not sufficient to allow adequate digits; and second, the part
number was not at all recognizable to the supplier. The
former was a shortcoming (in regard to this study) in the
51
information system software, the latter was assumed to be
predominately data entry errors.
On those occasions where part numbers were not usable,
attempts were made to identify components by purchase order
numbers. This was successful only once. It failed due to the
age of the data. While less than two years old, and in many
instances less than one year old, none of the applicable
suppliers maintained purchase order information in a readily
accessible fashion beyond six months to one year.
In only one instance did anyone refuse to lend assistance
over the telephone. This researcher thought this to be
significant. In light of company proprietary information and
agreements not to divulge information to third parties, more
resistance was expected.
As presented, the research methodology was an evolving
process that took a form significantly different than
anticipated by the researcher. The data collected, and an
analysis of that data, are presented in the following chapter.
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V. CASE STUDY FINDINGS
A. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this study was to examine a selected area
within the broad concern of foreign sourcing and the
industrial base. The data presented in this chapter reflect
that developed in a case study performed to test the extent to
which foreign sourced components are used in U.S. manufactured
test equipment and the implications of such sourcing. The
scope of this study was limited to that of special test
equipment (STE) used in the production manufacturing process.
The data that follow represent a segment of one year of
sustaining operations of the HARM missile program's production
STE. As used here, sustaining operations are those material
requirements that reflect the repair, upkeep and modification
to production STE already in service. The most recently
completed project for which material usage data were available
was the contract period November 1988 to October 1989. Texas
Instruments Inc., is the prime, sole source, contractor for
the HARM missile. The production site is located in
Lewisville, Texas.
With few exceptions, production STE employed by the
manufacturer is owned by the government. When utilizing
government owned equipment, the manufacturer must maintain a
variety of information concerning use and support of that
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equipment. That information provided the foundation of this
study.
B. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA
A computer generated list of components and materials used
to support the HARM missile production STE through this
contract period contained over 1800 line items. The quantities
for each line item were typically one or two but in some
instances were as many as 100 or 200. The large quantity
items were hardware items such as washers and screws. The
information provided for each line item included: Texas
Instruments and vendor part numbers, purchase order number,
supplier and quantity ordered. Materials were obtained from
approximately 260 suppliers. These suppliers included both
manufacturers that sold directly to Texas Instruments and
vendors that represented a variety of manufacturers.
Of approximately 1800 line items represented in sustaining
operations, over 170 individual part numbers had multiple
entries. This reflected two or more purchase actions for a
specific part number. An additional 80 line items were repair
charges, set up charges and calibration charges. In effect,
the multiple entries and service charges reduced the number of
line items, or actual material/component part numbers
required, by several hundred.
Of the 260 suppliers associated with supporting these
continuing operations, 62 were contacted. These 62 suppliers
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represented approximately 'hree-fourths of the individual
items purchased. In an attempt to determine the item
nomenclature and place of manufacture, 39 of the 62 contacted
were capable and willing to provide the requested information
to the best of their ability. The ability of the suppliers to
furnish additional information depended to a great extent on
the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the
researcher.
There were 280 different part numbered items identified by
suppliers as materials and components supplied to Texas
Instruments in support of HARM missile production STE for the
period November 1988 to October 1989. Table V-i presents a
sampling of those materials and their countries of origin.
Of the 280 part numbers that were identified, three were
clearly determined to have originated outside the United
states. Four other components were routinely manufactured in
both the U.S. and several Pacific Rim Countries and could not
be further isolated with the data provided. Tables V-2 and V-
3 list the known and possible foreign sourced components.
Rare earth metals, such as columbium and selenium, are not
listed although historically, these types of materials have
been recognized as foreign sourced.
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TABLE V-i
SAMPLE OF ITEMS USED IN CONTINUING OPERATIONS
Item Country of Manufacture
Delrin plastic U.S.
Teflon rod U.S.
AC current sensor/controller U.S.
Single axis motion controller U.S.
Cable assemblies U.S.
Cable connecters/adapters U.S.
Wide band amplifier U.S.
Polyvinylidene tubing U.S.
Polyester sleeve U.S.
Micro wave amplifier, 2-8 GHz U.S.
Micro wave amplifier, 4-8 GHz U.S.
Micro wave amplifier, 12-18 GHz U.S.
Open reel computer tape U.S.
Custom software U.S.
Pneumatic solenoid/valve U.S.
Voltage controlled attenuator U.S.
Specialty hardware (nuts, studs) U.S.
Power supply U.S.






Gasket, stainless steel U.S.
Gasket, nickel U.S.
Traveling wave tube U.S.
Low pass filter U.S.





Low voltage board U.S.




Instrument low power amplifier Thailand
Switch Japan
Knob Japan
Rare earth components **
• Items were identified as manufactured in U.S. or Malaysia.
Further determination was not possible with data provided.
Both locations are common sources.
** Specific applications were not included. However, one
manufacturer indicated that rare earth components used in
their products, originate overseas.
TABLE V-2
ITEMS KNOWN TO BE MANUFACTURED OUT OF THE U.S.
Ite a yU
Knob Japan 1 $ .84
Switch Japan 1 $18.80
Low Power Amp. Thailand 1 $21.62
TABLE V-3
ITEMS OF UNINOWN U.S./PACIFIC RIM ORIGIN
Ite QuntityUni Pic
IC display Driver 1 $ 4.00
Lamp Assembly 1 $17.50
LED 1 $ 6.00
Rectifier 1 $28.00
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C. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
In absolute terms, the data presented would indicate that
three of the 280 items, or 1.07 percent of the components
sampled, were obtained from foreign sources. If the
additional four components of possible foreign sourcing are
considered, 2.5 percent of the components may have been
foreign sourced. One could interpret this to mean few foreign
sourced components are used in this particular production STE.
Of the items known to have been manufactured overseas, only
one item, the low power amplifier shown in Table V-2, did not
appear to have an equivalent produced in the U.S. However,
caution must be exercised when viewing these figures. There
are several concerns that may skew the findings as presented.
First, the usage data reflect only those materials
required to maintain or modify existing equipment. A similar
relationship might be assumed to exist between those materials
used in the initial construction and continuing operations,
but no factual relationship was attempted in this study.
A second issue was that several of the vendors supplying
the greatest quantities of materials did not respond with
information concerning the place of manufacture of the
materials they provided. There is the possibility that the
larger vendors, with greater resources and possibly more
global networks, will purchase more from foreign sources than
a smaller, regional vender. If that is true, it follows that
the materials they sell will be representative of the original
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sources. In this study a significant number of the responding
vendors and manufacturers that sell to Texas Instruments are
located in the same geographical region as the HARM missile
production site. It was not possible to calculate any error
that may have been induced by the non-responsiveness of
several large vendors.
Throughout the study there was occasional difficulty in
identifying individual part numbers. These problems surfaced
in two ways: one, the part number was not at all recognizable
by the indicated supplier; and two, the part number was
recognizable to some extent, but appeared to have digits
transposed or missing.
In the first situation, where no identification was
possible, there was no alternative but to discard that item.
Assuming the ratio of foreign versus domestic supplied
components not able to be identified, is similar to the ratio
of those that were identified, discarding these has little or
no effect on the final balance between U.S. and foreign
sourced items.
In the second situation it was normally possible to make
use of the data. For example; if it was known that the item
was one of two amplifiers, and they were both manufactured in
the same location, but a missing suffix on the part number
only precluded determining which of two frequency ranges it
was, that item was counted.
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No materials in this study were found to have been
purchased directly from a foreiqn source by Texas Instruments.
In those instances where vendors purchased from foreign
sources, the vendor was asked to provide a reason for the
foreign versus U.S. produced material. Only one item, the low
power amplifier shown in Table V-2, was addressed
specifically. The reason given was "economic." The
researcher takes this to imply that the item may be available
elsewhere but the foreign source was less expensive.
In the other instances of foreign or possibly foreign
sourced materials, general reasons were provided. The two
reasons given were price and availability, with price being
the predominate of the two. Vendors purchasing materials from
foreign sources indicated that the materials they buy are
typically low technology, high volume, common items in which
a foreign producer can take advantage of economies of scale
and a large semi-skilled work force. Availability was an
issue only because the types of items just discussed are not
produced in great quantities in the U.S. In each instance
where it was discussed with a vendor, the vendor was confident
that a U.S. source or capability existed should the foreign
supply be disrupted.
In general terms, and not necessarily directly related to
the components identified in this case study, vendors
contacted indicated countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan and
Mexico as the primary sources of foreign materials that would
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be used in STE. When used, the products of the Pacific Rim
countries include common electronics components, and simple
assemblies and subassemblies. Mexico was utilized mostly for
non-complex assembly work. It is not unusual for a U.S.
manufacturer to provide materials to a Mexican facility for
assembly or partial assembly, after which they are returned to
the U.S. for final assembly and testing.
It is the belief of the researcher that despite the
potential influences discussed above, these data present an
accurate picture of the overall trend in the mix of U.S. and
foreign sourced materials used in the production STE of this
case study. This researcher does not believe that the data
are extensive enough to support a specific claim that foreign
sourced items represent 2.5 percent or less of all materials
used in continuing operations in support of STE.
These data also support the opinions and judgments of
several professionals involved in the manufacture and support
of production STE. Early in the research performed to
complete this study, these industry representatives were
contacted in a search for information concerning earlier
studies in this field. While no studies were identified, each
person, based on personal experience, suggested that few
foreign sourced components would be found in this type of
special test equipment.
Responses to the research questions, a summary and areas
for further study are provided in the following chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. RESTATEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE
The object of this study was to examine the industrial
base issue of foreign sourcing. The area of focus was that of
manufacturing production special test equipment (STE). The
intent was to determine the extent of foreign sourced
materials and components in production STE, what those
materials are, and what the implications are.
In general terms, test equipment is equipment used to
test, measure and diagnose other equipment or products. There
are hundreds of types of test equipment with thousands of
variations. To narrow the scope of this study, only
production special test equipment was examined. This test
equipment is designed for a specific and often unique
application in a production process.
The findings were developed by extracting material usage
data for one year of continuing operations of the HARM missile
production STE used by Texas Instruments. Continuing
operations were those requirements necessary to maintain,
modify and provide general support to existing equipment. Of
over 1800 line items provided by approximately 260 suppliers,
approximately 280 line items provided by 39 suppliers were
identified and the country of origin determined for each.
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The statements that follow are based on an analysis of the
cited data, opinions of industry representatives, and
qualifications as stated.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This section restates and addresses the research questions
presented in Chapter I.
Primary research auestion: To what extent are the
components and materials used to manufacture special test
equipment obtained from .foreign sources and what are the
implications of reliance upon foreign sources?
Because of the previously stated restrictions the results
of this study are not statistically conclusive. However, when
confined in scope to the manufacture of production STE, and
according to the data developed in the case study, there was
little use of foreign sourced materials and components. This
conclusion was anticipated by the professional opinion of
several industry representatives specializing in production
STE.
The implications of relying on foreign sourced materials
can not be answered as stated, since no instances were
discovered in the case study or the literature review except
for rare earth metals. Reliance on rare earth metals is a
well documented fact and is principally compensated for
through stock piling.
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Concerning the potential inability to continue production
operations should the flow of these few foreign sourced items
stop, industry representatives did not foresee a problem.
First, most foreign sourced materials in this equipment were
not complex and are well within the capabilities of U.S.
manufacturers to reproduce.
Secondly, it is not uncommon, regardless of the original
source, for a required replacement item to be no longer
available when needed. When this happens, a suitable
substitute is used if available. If not, the applicable
portion of the STE is redesigned around a component that is
available. Another way Texas Instruments minimized the impact
of such a shortage was by stocking a significant number of
repair pieces. It maintains a stock of over 4700 purchase
part items, purchased with HARM project dollars and dedicated
to the support of HARM production STE. Texas Instruments also
maintains an overhead equipment and support system to support
their equipment not contractually dedicated to a given
project.
Should a source of materials go away, representatives
indicated sufficient time was available to locate or develop
another. It must be remembered that material requirements for
production STE, which is relatively static equipment, will be
significantly less than for an actual production item going
out to customers.
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Secondary research auestion: What are the STE components
and materials?
When components and materials are obtained from foreign
sources for use in the manufacture of production STE, they
were limited to rare earth metals, low technology, high volume
electronics components and simple assemblies and
subassemblies.
Secondary research question: What components and
materials are obtained exclusively from foreign sources, or,
in addition to domestic sources?
Beyond rare earth metals, only one component was found to
be obtained exclusively from foreign sources in the
manufacture of production STE. A low power amplifier was
obtained from a foreign source without a direct equivalent
also being obtained from a U.S. source. But based on the
types of items obtained from U.S. sources, it is highly
improbable that a compatible item is not available from
domestic sources.
Several items were found to be available and obtained from
both foreign and domestic sources. These included knobs,
switches and LED's. Some simple, low-level assembly work was
done in Mexico and various Pacific Rim countries.
Secondary research auestion: What are the principal
reasons components and materials are obtained from foreign
sources?
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Although the sample size is considerably smaller than
desired, the principal reasons those production STE components
and materials sampled were obtained from foreign sources are
economics and availability. The materials obtained from
foreign sources are predominately high volume, low technology
items produced in countries with a large semi-skilled work
force. Typically their operating expenses are low and they
produce large volume items to take advantage of economies of
scale. For reasons not determined in this study, domestic
manufacturers often do not compete in these markets.
At the site of the production STE, cost of a needed
component is not normally an issue. There are two reasons for
this. First, since individual component consumption is low,
the time and expense of searching for a less expensive item
will quickly surpass any savings. Second, a disrupted
production line can be far more costly from the delay
searching for a less expensive replacement component than the
cost savings of a cheaper replacement.
Availability is somewhat deceiving. As previously stated,
items that are more readily available from foreign sources are
so because they are high volume, low cost production items.
U.S. manufacturers do not produce these in significant
quantities. However, there are no indications that the U.S.
does not possess the capability to produce these items.
Again, the exception is rare earth metals where the U.S. is
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not likely to achieve independence unless future technology
reduces the requirement to use them.
C. SUMMARY
Based on a selected analysis of data, it was discovered
that there is not a high incidence of foreign sourced
materials and components in the HARM missile production STE.
It is also concluded that the production STE examined is
representative of production STE that would be found
throughout much of industry. Both of these opinions are based
on analysis of the HARM missile production STE data and the
professional judgments of industry representatives.
The findings of this study must be qualified for several
reasons. First, the study examined production STE on only one
of thousands of production lines throughout the country. On
that production line, only one year of continuing operations
were examined. No data were examined of all components that
comprised any single piece of equipment.
The use of data from material usage and purchase actions
to determine the extent to which foreign sourced components
and materials are utilized proved to be a reasonable approach.
It would have been preferable to have gathered data by first
using drawings to identify components, backtracking through
engineering and possibly purchasing to determine the
suppliers, and then through the suppliers to determine the
components' origin. However, this would require significant
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funding resources to pay for such a study. It would also have
been preferable to have had the resources to explore a larger
sampling of suppliers and components, and to have been able to
further reduce assemblies to their component parts.
The hypothesis that led to this research was that as much
as 30 percent of the components in U.S. test equipment are
foreign sourced. This study does not provide sufficient data
to dispute or support that statement. As discussed, the
hypothesis does not hold true for the sample of production STE
examined here. The hypothesis may be true for instances of
other test equipment.
As stated earlier, there is a wide variety of types of
test equipment. Unlike the production STE of this study,
which is essentially custom built, many types of test
equipment are mass produced. These are types of test
equipment that have a wide range of generic applications.
Examples include voltage meters, current meters, frequency
counters and frequency generators. Test equipment of this
type is common and purchased "off the shelf." It is used by
television and radio repair shops, scientific laboratories,
NASA and a myriad of defense contractors and military units.
Variations are used by hobbyists in their basements, and major
corporations when maintaining their production STE.
It is in these general types of test equipment that the
researcher suspects a large portion of foreign sourced
components may be used. These pieces of test equipment are
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relatively simple and produced in large quantities. Their
production and component demand criteria might well meet those
which would encourage foreign sourced materials. If other
countries, the Pacific Rim countries specifically, continue to
develop their production capabilities for high volume, low
technology items, while the U.S. manufacturers concentrate on
high technology items, it follows that the concentration of
foreign sourced components in these types of test equipment
will be high and continue to grow.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following are suggested areas of future research.
Some do not specifically deal with production STE, but were
topics uncovered in gathering research for this thesis.
Readdress this same area of study, i.e., foreign sourcing
and manufacturing of production special test equipment. The
literature review and contact with industry representatives
failed to uncover earlier studies. This study, which was very
limited, fails to offer absolute, conclusive evidence that
foreign sourced materials are not a potential area of concern
for the U.S. manufacturing industry. More than one production
line, and a complete breakout of all components of STE should
be made. A requirement for such a study will be sufficient,
dedicated resources.
Determine the extent and implications of foreign sourced
materials in common, widely used U.S. test equipment. In a
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selected field, is the United States an industry leader or
follower? What is the future of a selected test equipment
industry and how will that affect the industry it supports?
The U.S. is reducing its export deficit in low technology
manufactured goods and loosing its trade surplus in high
technology manufactured goods. This presents several
questions: Where does the U.S. stand in global competition?
Where is it going? Why? What will be the impact on
tomorrow's industrial base? Should industry be concerned?
What role can or should the government play?
Is America's perception of increasing reliance on foreign
sourced materials accurate? An article in the Harvard
Business Review by Robert B. Reich, titled "Who Is Us?",
discusses the global market place and global corporations.
The statistics on imports and exports may be deceiving. For
example, IBM Japan, with over 18,000 employees and annual
sales in excess of $6 billion, is one of Japan's leading
exporters of computers. [Ref. 27] What portion of U.S.
imports are actually products of U.S. companies operating
overseas? What would the consequences be if the U.S. did not
actively participate in these markets?
Does the U.S. need a Ministry of International Trade and
Industry or something like it? The literature review revealed
that there is some consensus that the U.S. would benefit from
an organization similar to Japan's MITI. In many ways the
Department of Defense is acting as the nation's MITI. With
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concerns for the defense industrial base and ultimately the
nation's industrial base, DoD is targeting selected areas for
research and development, and even preservation of U.S.
capabilities. Is DoD the best agency to preform this task?
Possibly it should fall within the Department of Commerce.
Within industry there is a tremendous number of trade
associations already in existence. Is it possible or even
desirable for them to establish a nongovernment office to
safeguard America's industry? Another approach might be a
government/industry association to review and evaluate U.S.
technologies and capabilities. Ultimately they would
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